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1 Introduction
Many claims are made in favour of decentralisation,
ranging from the democratising potential of increased
scope for participation and accountability through to
poverty reduction and improved service delivery.
Much of the literature and evidence centres on the
intrinsic value of decentralisation as a desirable goal in
its own right. But the arguments for the
developmental significance of decentralisation rest
principally on a series of assumptions and theoretical
justifications. Proponents of decentralisation base
their assumptions on widely differing criteria, ranging
from expected improvements in allocative efficiency,
welfare and equity, through to increased
participation, accountability and responsiveness on the
part of local authorities. Economists tend to frame
their analysis in terms of the costs and benefits of
decentralisation, while other social scientists and
practitioners are generally concerned with processes
and democratic aspects of the process (Blair 2000).
This article focuses on substantive development
outcomes, centred on how far decentralisation
produces improvements in service delivery for the
poor, drawing on evidence concerning equity and
efficiency and the political and institutional
conditions which give rise to these outcomes. The
literature on democratic decentralisation and service
delivery generally falls into two distinct categories:
opportunities for enhanced popular participation and
increased accountability of local authorities, or on
forms of service delivery involving a plurality of
actors. A major problem with the empirical literature
is that there is no systematic or comparative
evidence on whether increased participation in
decentralised local governance generates better
outputs in terms of improvements in the provision of
health, education and drinking water and sanitation
services for poor and marginalised people. The
available evidence draws either on examples from
single countries and sectors, or is anecdotal,
temporally specific and highly localised, thus
rendering the task of generalisation problematic.
Similarly, efforts to measure development outcomes,
in terms of reduced poverty or improved social
indicators, and to attribute these to increased
devolution and participation, are inconclusive and
fraught with methodological problems (Crook and
Sverrisson 2003; Dyer and Rose 2005).
These data constraints pose a serious challenge to
advocates of participation and local governance,
since the material benefits for the poor arising from
improved service provision should be a key
determinant of the effectiveness of democratic
decentralisation. The intrinsic value of increased
participation, accountability and responsiveness
should not be underestimated, especially when
political rights have been previously curtailed under
centralised, authoritarian regimes. However, unless
these process changes demonstrably translate into
enduring improvements in service provision and
material well-being, the claims made for the pro-
poor potential of democratic decentralisation remain
incomplete and cannot easily be sustained.
Some definitional issues are in order at this point.
Decentralisation encapsulates three distinct
elements: (1) fiscal decentralisation, entailing the
transfer of financial resources in the form of grants
and tax-raising powers to sub-national units of
government; (2) administrative decentralisation
(sometimes referred to as deconcentration), where
the functions performed by central government are
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transferred to geographically distinct administrative
units; (3) political decentralisation where powers and
responsibilities are devolved to elected local
governments; this form of decentralisation is
synonymous with democratic decentralisation. Our
concern in this article is mainly with democratic
decentralisation, but several experiments in
decentralised service delivery have involved the
transfer of financial or administrative powers to sub-
national units of government that are not subject to
democratic oversight through competitive elections.
These variations in the form and content of
decentralisation have an important bearing on
processes of participation, accountability and
responsiveness and in turn on service delivery
outcomes.
The focus of this article is mainly on equity and social
justice concerns, and some elaboration is required of
the meaning and application of these terms with
respect to service delivery. Equity outcomes have two
main dimensions: access to services across different
groups of the population on the basis of income,
gender and other categories, and inter-regional equity
in terms of disparities in access within and across local
government jurisdictions (Litvack et al. 1998: 8). The
provision of affordable, accessible and appropriate
services to all categories of a population in equal
measure is a universal standard for determining such
outcomes, but a social justice perspective on service
provision privileges the benefits that directly accrue to
economically and socially marginalised groups (One
World Action 1999, 2001).
Services are often equated with public goods like
health, education, drinking water and sanitation and
these tend to be the most common forms of
services provided by local governments in developing
countries. Police, fire, transportation, housing and
social welfare services also fall under local
government jurisdictions in many countries. Local
governments are also given responsibility for a range
of other public services, such as infrastructure in the
form of roads and bridges, public buildings, and
housing, especially in larger jurisdictions and urban
authorities. In many countries, specialised services for
low-income groups are the responsibility of local
governments, such as social welfare, credit, and
agricultural extension. Local authorities in rural areas
often perform a range of functions directed at
agriculture and rural development, environmental
management, disaster prevention and rehabilitation.
Our focus in this article is principally on health and
education as services that impact most directly on
the well-being of the poor, as well as urban and
rural infrastructure.
In most countries, public services are largely provided
by the state, through government departments and
specialised agencies, while private sector provision is
becoming increasingly common in all areas of service
provision as a result of state failure, and through
privatisation and contracting-out that encourages
market competition at the local level. Public service
delivery is no longer the exclusive prerogative of
state agencies in national and local governments, but
involves combinations of state and private actors, and
increasingly civil society organisations that are
directly engaged in the delivery of services.
2 Decentralisation and service delivery
outcomes
A leading rationale for decentralisation is that it can
generate financial, efficiency and quality gains by
devolving resources and decision-making powers to
local governments for the delivery of services. It is
financially attractive to national governments
because part of the burden of financing services can
be shifted to sub-national units and private providers
which can produce these at lower cost. The
allocative efficiency argument is that productivity of
health, education and other services can be
maximised by enabling local governments to take
decisions on the allocation of scarce resources, since
they have a better sense of local preferences. In the
process, decentralised units of government can
become more accountable in resource allocation
decisions. It is further argued that the quality of
service provision can also be enhanced by
decentralisation since local governments will be
more sensitive to variations in local requirements and
open to feedback from users of services (Azfar et al.
2004: 21–4).
At the same time, the literature draws attention to
the risks involved in decentralisation. First, there is no
automatic assurance that increased political
autonomy for local governments will lead to
improvements in public services. Second, there is the
well-known risk of capture by local political élites,
which can worsen equity in the delivery of services.
Third, the technical capacities of local government
staff may be inadequate. Fourth, decentralisation can
widen regional disparities in the provision of public
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services. Fifth, decentralisation poses
macroeconomic risks by increasing government
vulnerability to financial deficits and over-expanding
the size of the public sector (Burki et al. 1999: 3–4).
Governments of very different ideological hues in
Latin America, Africa and to a lesser extent, Asia,
have experimented with decentralised service
delivery over the past two decades. Initiatives have
centred on the transfer of powers and resources to
lower tiers of government, through a combination
of measures involving a process of deconcentration
to sub-national agencies operating under central line
departments, and devolution of power and resources
to elected local authorities. National governments
have devolved responsibilities for different types of
services across countries and jurisdictions
accompanied by different degrees of fiscal
decentralisation. It is therefore difficult to make
generalisations across sectors and countries. For
these reasons, the data on the impacts of
decentralisation on service delivery outcomes are
partial and incomplete, and some caution is required
in the interpretation of available evidence in the
absence of cross-national and cross-sectoral studies.
In the remainder of this section, the available
evidence from different parts of the world is
reviewed, to determine whether any general lessons
or patterns emerge on the relationship between
political devolution and equity and efficiency
outcomes.
2.1 Latin America
The decentralisation process has progressed furthest
in Latin America, beginning with efforts in Chile and
Colombia in the early 1980s, to delegate increased
responsibilities to municipalities (sub-national
administrations) for the delivery of health and
education services. These reforms emanated from a
variety of domestic circumstances that differed
between countries in the region. In some cases,
conditions of resource scarcity brought about by
macroeconomic crisis spurred countries to devolve
responsibility to lower tiers of government (Prawda
1993). Governments in Colombia, Argentina and
Brazil devolved powers to elected municipalities as
part of a wider process of political liberalisation,
whereas the military regime in Chile favoured
administrative deconcentration to municipalities
under the control of non-elected administrators
appointed by the military (Nickson 1995). In Chile,
where the reforms were far-reaching, the transfer of
responsibility for primary and secondary education
and primary healthcare to municipalities was
accompanied by measures designed to expand
private schools and healthcare facilities. According to
Stewart and Ranis (1994), ‘Municipal governments
thus acted like “service delivery agents”, providing
local public services on a cost-effective basis, without
having local governing power’.
Latin American municipalities deliver services in four
ways: directly through municipal secretariats and
departments; indirectly through municipally owned
foundations; through enterprises owned by the
municipalities or as joint ventures with the private
sector; and through contracts to private companies
or voluntary agencies (Nickson 1995). The absence of
comparative data on the equity impact of
decentralised service delivery in Latin America makes
it difficult to derive well-founded conclusions, but
there is some cross-country data available for
particular sectors.
Prawda’s comparative review of educational
decentralisation in four Latin American countries in
the 1980s – Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico –
provides some insights into the equity and efficiency
impacts of these reforms (Prawda 1993). From this
comparative analysis Prawda concluded that
decentralisation of education did not lead to
discernible quality improvements, but rather produced
negative equity effects, with the result that the gap
between better off and worse off schools actually
widened. Educational expenditures fell in three of the
four countries (with the exception of Argentina) on
account of sharp decreases in teachers’ salaries, under
conditions of fiscal austerity, which may well have
impacted adversely on teaching quality.
Four key lessons arise from Prawda’s review:
(1) educational decentralisation does not
automatically accomplish productivity, equity, and
quality improvements; (2) it requires a lengthy
gestation period before it starts producing benefits;
(3) continuous changes of senior personnel in central
and local administrations are inimical to reform; and
(4) an expansion in private provision has widened the
performance gap between schools and income
groups (Prawda 1993: 262). He argues that fiscal
incentives should be built into the decentralisation
process to stimulate the performance of local
governments by rewarding local revenue-raising
efforts and penalising severe budgetary deficits.
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Chile is the only Latin American country for which
data is available on cognitive achievement in selected
subjects, which serves as a proxy for determining the
impact of the reforms on quality and equity in
education provision. According to Prawda, ‘as
measured by cognitive achievement results, it is quite
clear that quality did not improve in the 1982–1988
period. It is also clear that inequity widened
significantly at that time’ (Prawda 1993: 258). These
findings are corroborated by Parry, who found that
decentralisation and privatisation have exacerbated
the negative consequences of educational
decentralisation, resulting in greater inequity in
expenditures and greater differences in the
performance of students from different income
groups (Parry 1997: 116–7). Declining real per capita
expenditures and competition for students between
municipal and private schools also had some negative
consequences for equity in the 1980s but remedial
measures introduced by civilian governments after
1992 counterbalanced these trends (Parry 1997:
128–9). Municipal councils and mayors are now
elected and municipalities have been provided with
additional funds to cover service outlays, but
discretionary power to raise additional resources
remains limited (Stewart and Ranis 1994).
Regarding healthcare, evidence from six Latin
American countries indicates that the quality of
service provision has worsened under
decentralisation. Transfer of financial resources and
staff to lower levels of government neither improved
service delivery nor reduced the costs of care (Burki et
al. 1999: 75–86). Chile provides some evidence on the
equity effects of decentralisation and privatisation of
healthcare provision under the military regime in the
1980s (Gideon 2001). One review concluded that ‘In
general, the transfer of primary care clinics to
municipalities has not resulted in extending coverage
or in improving the quality of services, largely because
of a lack of professional supervision and poor health
planning by the area health services’ (Montoya-Aguilar
and Vaughan 1990). Despite vigorous efforts to
promote private health provision and to delegate
responsibility for public healthcare provision to the
municipalities, two-thirds of all medical consultations
and 80 per cent of hospitalisations were still state-
funded in the mid-1990s, supported by 7 per cent tax
on earnings and pensions. Problems continued to
affect the quality of public healthcare provision
through municipalities, despite measures to improve
targeting and resourcing: ‘Although low-income
earners receive “free” healthcare, “access is difficult,
waiting times are long, services are of poor quality,
and facilities and provision of pharmaceuticals
meager”’ (Gillion and Bonilla, cited in Tankersley and
Cuzán 1996: 113). However, since it is difficult to
disaggregate the effects of decentralisation from
privatisation and fiscal constraints the problems of
public health provision under the municipalities
cannot easily be attributed to local administrative
arrangements alone.
Colombia is the one other Latin American country for
which evidence on the impact of decentralisation on
service delivery is available. In response to growing
social protests over the declining quality of public
services, the Colombian government devolved
responsibility for public services to elected
municipalities, and sharply increased inter-
governmental transfers and revenue-raising powers
from the late 1980s (Forero and Salazar 1991: 122).
Local governments assumed responsibility for the
provision of services in education, health, water,
sanitation, roads and agricultural extension. The
evidence suggests that satisfaction levels with
municipal governments increased after the
introduction of direct elections for mayors in 1988.
Case studies of individual municipalities and opinion
surveys ‘found evidence of increased service coverage,
citizen satisfaction, attention to rural areas and the
poor, cost consciousness and resource mobilization
efforts’ (Fiszbein 1997: 1030). There is some evidence
from this research of a positive relationship between
the strength of community participation and
government performance: municipalities that
followed a more open and inclusive approach to
policymaking were positioned to achieve better
outcomes. The majority of individuals surveyed in a
sample of 16 municipalities believed that municipal
governments play a central role in the provision of
education, water and roads. An overwhelming
majority reported greater trust in local than national
government and a larger number of individuals prefer
the municipal government to be in charge of overall
service provision (Fiszbein 1997: 1035). Municipalities
assumed responsibility for public education after 1991
with the formation of councils composed of teachers,
parents and students to run local schools. Councils
were given the right to elect principals, but hiring
remained under the control of the Ministry of
Education. Autonomous regions, communities and
schools were given power to adapt curricula, raising
concerns about fragmentation (Astiz et al. 2002: 75).
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Comparative evidence on health and educational
decentralisation in Latin America in the 1980s and
1990s points to several conclusions. First, it is difficult
to derive hard and fast generalisations on the basis of
partial and incomplete evidence. Second, the
implications for equity have been negative, with
divergences between poorer and wealthier groups in
accessing health and educational services. This finding
is consistent with the broader literature on
educational decentralisation. In this respect, Dyer and
Rose (2005: 107) state, ‘The assumed benefits of
decentralisation are … contested in relation to equity,
for which it is often found to have negative
consequences. Decentralization can widen quality
differences between schools, and performance gaps
between students, in wealthy and poor areas’.
Similar observations hold true for the health sector.
Third, as the contrasting cases of Chile and Colombia
demonstrate, political and institutional conditions
have a significant bearing on decentralisation
outcomes and levels of user satisfaction. This point is
taken up at greater length in the concluding section
of the article.
2.2 Sub-Saharan Africa
The evidence from sub-Saharan Africa is very limited
and even more qualified as regards the equity impact
of decentralised service delivery (Conyers, in this IDS
Bulletin). Despite the inclusion of decentralisation in
public sector reform efforts in the 1980s and early
1990s by countries such as Uganda, Botswana,
Nigeria, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya and Tanzania,
one leading commentator has stated that ‘there are
no real success stories as far as improved
development performance at the local level is
concerned’ (Adamolekun, cited in Francis and James
2003). This stark finding is corroborated by Wunsch
(2001), who attributes to failure of decentralisation in
Africa to problems such as the over-centralisation of
resources, limited transfers to sub-national
governments, a weak local revenue base, lack of
local planning capacity, limited changes in legislation
and regulations, and the absence of meaningful local
political process. These dismal assessments are
reflected in studies of local governance and
decentralised service provision from a number of
countries in the region (Olowu and Wunsch 2004).
Uganda is one African country that has pursued a
potentially far-reaching decentralisation experiment
since the late 1980s, with increased availability of
resources for national social service programmes,
especially for education, health and drinking water
infrastructure channelled through local councils. But
the evidence suggests that ‘Decentralization has not
been able to arrest the deterioration in agricultural
services, and that the improvements in social services
are attributable to increases in central conditional
funding rather than the very limited scope which
decentralized institutions have provided for local
decision making’ (Francis and James 2003: 333).
In Côte d’Ivoire, new opportunities were created for
popular participation through the introduction of
multi-party competition for local council (commune)
elections, but the mayors continued to exert
overriding control and influence. As a result, the
preferences expressed by local people for roads,
social facilities and water supplies did not correspond
to spending priorities of the communes, which
focused on municipal buildings and secondary
schools. In any case, most commune development
programmes collapsed in the face of public spending
cuts during the financial crisis of the early 1990s. It is
therefore unsurprising that only one-third of those
interviewed in four sample communes felt that the
communes addressed their development needs
(Crook and Sverrisson 2001: 26). A similar finding
emerged from Ghana, where survey evidence from
two districts demonstrated that 70 per cent of
respondents felt that the elected assembly did not
respond to their needs. Expressed preferences for
road repairs, health facilities, water supplies and
electricity were not reflected in district assembly
expenditure priorities which focused on commercial
transport services, farming, manufacturing
enterprises or markets, a situation exacerbated by
the dominance of recurrent expenditures in district
budgets (Crook and Sverrisson 2001: 32). In Nigeria,
a study of primary healthcare in the early 1990s
revealed a complete lack of real participation in
decision making despite devolution of responsibility
to elected local officials. Local residents saw primary
healthcare as unreliable, ineffective and unresponsive
to their needs, while councillors were unclear of the
health needs of their constituents, and had little
knowledge of health plans and activities (Crook and
Sverrisson 2001: 32).
This brief review indicates that the evidence on the
service delivery outcomes in Africa is even more
slender than for Latin America. Moreover, from the
limited evidence that exists, there is little to indicate
that the various decentralisation experiments under
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way across the continent are generating the expected
development dividends and that citizens have yet to
see any real improvement in service quality.
2.3 South Asia
Evidence from Asia is very limited, largely because
decentralisation initiatives in countries of the region
are more recent in origin, and because in most
South Asian countries, health and education services
have only been devolved to a limited extent. There
are few comparative studies of service delivery
outcomes resulting from decentralisation in the
region, and limited insights from sector experience in
particular countries. Recent country studies of
healthcare spending under decentralisation in China,
India, Indonesia and the Philippines point to a decline
or stagnation after decentralisation started in these
countries. In China and India, local governments
were unable to fulfil their new responsibilities for
healthcare provision in the absence of inadequate
resource transfers from central government. But in
contrast, health outcomes in Indonesia and the
Philippines improved significantly during
decentralisation, reflected in a sharp decline in the
under-five mortality rate, largely because of reforms
in healthcare funding (OECD 2006).
Drawing on survey data from 33,000 households in
villages across India, Mahal et al. (2000) demonstrate
that decentralisation of public service delivery in
primary healthcare and education services is
positively correlated with improved child mortality
and school enrolment. However, health and
education services in India are generally under the
jurisdiction of state governments and local councils
have limited influence over the use of resources or
deployment of personnel. Elected councils have
limited discretion over the use of resources for
developmental purposes, which are largely
earmarked for schemes and programmes determined
by state and central governments. It is only in the
Indian states of West Bengal and Kerala that
decentralisation of expenditures for basic services has
taken place on a significant scale, by placing
substantial untied funds at the discretion of local
village councils for developmental purposes. In the
West Bengal case, sample evidence points to
improvements in access to administrative and justice
systems and water provision in some areas, amid an
overall improvement in agricultural productivity and
reduction in poverty levels in the 1980s, though it is
difficult to attribute these outcomes to
decentralisation and increased powers and resources
for elected local councils (Crook and Sverrisson
2003: 243). Preliminary evidence from Kerala’s
Popular Planning Campaign launched in 1996
indicates that local council expenditures more
accurately reflected local preferences, and
investments in infrastructure were more oriented
towards the needs of the poor (Isaac with Franke
2000; Chaudhuri and Heller 2002).
By comparison, successive decentralisation schemes
in Bangladesh have all failed to deliver improved
services. According to Crook and Sverrisson
(2001: 46), ‘Material welfare, in terms of agricultural
output, did not increase, there was little evidence of
greater equity at grassroots level, and a number of
studies indicated that the beneficiaries were the rich
and the well-born. Instead, decentralization was
generally seen as a means to channel development
resources into the hands of the better off’.
Responsibility for implementation of disaster relief
programmes was devolved to local councils under
the military government in the mid-1980s, but with
negative impacts: flood rehabilitation programmes
suffered from poor management, maldistribution,
corruption and shortages of resources, while few
very poor households received any benefits from
rehabilitation schemes that tended to focus on roads,
bridges and buildings.
This brief and partial review of the experience of
decentralised service delivery leads to the following
tentative conclusions. First, improved equity outcomes
have generally not been realised for poor and socially
marginalised people. Second, the quality of public
service provision has not improved as a result of the
devolution of power and resources to local
governments. The gap in quality between wealthier
and poorer areas has often increased under
decentralisation. Third, efficiency gains have been
realised, usually as a result of the delegation of financial
responsibility for service provision from central to local
governments, but resources have not been adequate to
ensure effective coverage and quality.
3 Improving equity through decentralised
service delivery
It is tempting to draw the conclusion that equity and
social justice objectives are not well served by
decentralised service provision, and that centralised
provision through deconcentrated state agencies is a
preferable approach (Johnson 2001;
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Schneider 2003). At the same time, the available
evidence confirms that increased participation and
better accountability can result from democratic
decentralisation, and that these substantive benefits
should not be underestimated (Crook and Manor
1998; Blair 2000). A poor record on service delivery
to date does not rule out the scope for improved
equity and efficiency outcomes. Rather, the
challenge is to identify the conditions under which
increased participation in local governance is
conducive to enhanced equity, quality and efficiency
of services. This will almost certainly require further
comparative research but it is possible to outline a
schema in which the potential for improvement rests
on a combination of political, institutional, financial
and technical factors.
3.1 Political commitment and leadership
Political factors are of intrinsic importance to
decentralised service delivery for several reasons. It is
widely accepted that political commitment on the
part of federal or state governments is a sine qua non
of effective democratic decentralisation, and
especially forms of decentralisation that are
specifically geared to the interests of the poor
(Crook and Sverrisson 2001; Blair 2000). Successful
pro-poor decentralisation is associated with
governing parties that are politically committed to
the democratic empowerment of local governments
(Heller 2001; Escheverri-Gent 1993).
The Indian state governments of West Bengal and
Kerala evince a strong commitment to decentralisation,
reflected in supportive legislation and a significant flow
of resources to lower levels of government. In
Colombia successive governments from the mid-1980s
have systematically devolved powers and resources to
municipalities, with positive consequences for service
delivery. Brazilian experience demonstrates how
political commitment at the level of individual
municipalities can explain a propensity for pro-poor
reform initiatives, such as the participatory budgeting
process in Porto Alegre and other municipalities
(Baiocchi 2001; Heller 2001). In contrast, evidence from
Africa and other Latin American countries
demonstrates that weak political commitment to
decentralisation opens up the possibility of élite
capture, limits the scope for participation, and results in
ineffective outcomes (Smith 1985).
Political leadership also plays an important role in
shaping service delivery outcomes, since politicians in
local governments do not respond with equal vigour
to the opportunities presented by high-level political
commitment to democratic decentralisation. This is
especially important in local administrations with
powerful, directly elected mayors who have the
authority to effect or block change mandated by
higher level political authorities. For instance, in the
Colombian case, mayors committed to deepening
the process of municipal decentralisation through
public consultation, and enhanced resource flow
registered higher levels of public satisfaction with
service delivery outcomes. According to Fiszbein
(1997: 1032), ‘competition for political office opened
the doors to responsible and innovative leadership
that became the driving force behind capacity
building. It was the combination of the added
responsibilities, more resources and political reforms
that created the environment conducive to the
emergence of effective local governments’.
3.2 Political mobilisation of the poor
The political impetus for democratic decentralisation
created by reform-minded political parties can create
opportunities for collective action from below by
mobilising constituencies that are traditionally
excluded from national policymaking arenas. This can
entail mobilisation of cadres and supporters by
political parties in local constituencies, and
mobilisation of the poor by civil society organisations
(NGOs, trade unions and social movements) to take
advantage of political openings from above and to
articulate public protest and dissent.
Party-based mobilisation can assume two forms in
the context of democratic decentralisation:
mobilisation of people though local units of political
parties for electoral purposes and mobilisation of
supporters to ensure effective implementation of
reform initiatives. Democratic decentralisation usually
entails the devolution of power to elected local
authorities, which in turn widens the scope of political
participation at the local level (Robinson 1998). In
many Latin American countries, municipalities were
traditionally run by non-elected administrators
appointed by military or authoritarian regimes.
Legislation introduced from the 1980s led to the
creation of elected mayors and local councils,
providing opportunities for political mobilisation
around competing policy agendas. However, political
parties are not always allowed to contest local
elections (e.g. Uganda, India and Pakistan), which
must be contested on an individual or no-party basis,
thus limiting the scope for party-based mobilisation.
However, in Brazil, Kerala and West Bengal, local
government elections serve as a basis for party-
based mobilisation around competing political
agendas, though the extent to which these hinge on
service delivery issues is not apparent.
Civil society organisations also mobilise constituencies
in local government jurisdictions to take advantage of
increased powers and resources, to mobilise people
to take part in consultative arenas, and to engage in
public protest over the quality of public services. In
Kerala, a prominent social movement (Kerala Sastra
Shitya Parishad – the People’s Science Movement)
played a critical role in shaping and implementing the
People’s Campaign for Decentralized Planning in the
late 1990s, though this has not been replicated
elsewhere in India (Isaac with Franke 2000;
Chaudhuri and Heller 2002). Civil society mobilisation
in response to increased powers to local governments
is particularly marked in Latin America, which may
reflect traditions of political resistance to
authoritarian rule, but also resource availability at the
local level. Social movements and trade unions played
a part in mobilising protest over the state of
municipal services in Colombia in the 1970s, which
served as a catalyst for subsequent reform of local
government. In the city of Cochabamba in Bolivia,
civil society organisations helped to articulate public
demonstrations over water privatisation and service
charges, resulting in remedial measures by the
municipal administration. Similarly, several South
African municipalities have witnessed civil society-led
protests over service standards and fees.
3.3 Institutionalised participation
Local authorities in different countries have
experimented with institutional arrangements
designed to facilitate public engagement, feedback
and oversight in recognition of the latent power of
organised civic protest. These include consultative
bodies designed to provide citizen oversight over
particular services, taking the form of health councils
and school boards. Prominent Latin American
examples include the local administrative boards in
Colombia, local area boards in São Paolo and the
neighbourhood councils of Montevideo, through to
more ambitious exercises designed to elicit
participation in decisions concerning priority setting
and resource allocations, exemplified by the
participatory budgeting exercises in Porto Alegre and
other Brazilian cities (Nickson 1995: 86–9).
Critics argue that such bodies serve to undermine
popular resistance and oversight, while their
proponents claim that institutionalised participation
facilitates and widens public engagement at the local
level in policy deliberation, planning and
implementation. However, in the absence of any
comparative evidence it is difficult to ascertain either
the prevalence of these bodies or their effectiveness in
influencing resource allocations or service standards.
3.4 Adequacy of financial resources
The availability of financial resources is a critical
determinant of the equity, quality and efficiency of
public services, and the inadequacy of financial
resources often contribute to poor service delivery
outcomes. Devolution of responsibility for service
provision to local governments is usually
accompanied by some element of financial
decentralisation through resource transfers, usually as
a share of central taxation, or enhanced powers to
raise revenues through a variety of local taxes (Bahl
and Linn 1994; Bird and Vaillancourt 1999). Fiscal
decentralisation often renders local governments
vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks and remedial
measures to control public expenditures and national
budget deficits. Several Latin American countries
experienced this phenomenon in the 1980s because
of economic stabilisation measures, which sharply
reduced spending on the social sectors and the value
of transfers to local governments. The quality and
reach of public services is bound to suffer in the
absence of complementary measures to raise local
resources. The financial imperative has been a key
factor underlying municipal privatisation initiatives
and the introduction of cost-sharing measures in the
form of user fees in local governments around the
world (Mawabu et al. 2001).
Another dimension of resource availability centres on
the financial powers of local governments. Salaries
and recurrent expenditures tend to account for a large
share of local government outlays on services,
especially in the health and education sectors, with
more limited resources available for capital
expenditures. Limited scope for discretionary
allocations across budget heads further restricts the
budgetary autonomy of local governments. Local
governments may also receive financial transfers that
are earmarked for certain programmes or
pre-assigned categories of expenditure. In India, for
example, local bodies receive grants-in-aid from state
and central government that are tied to specific anti-
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poverty and social welfare programmes, while
recurrent expenditures account for a very high
proportion of health and education budgets. The
financial autonomy of local governments is thus highly
constrained. A major exception is Kerala, where the
elected local councils have discretion over 40 per cent
of the state development budget, subject to broad
guidelines on different categories of expenditure,
which provides them with substantial scope to
respond to locally determined development priorities.
3.5 Technical and managerial capacity
The provision of public services can be an enormously
complex exercise, especially in urban municipalities
with large populations, and often requires a high
level of technical and managerial capacity. However,
decentralisation of responsibility for service provision
has not always been accompanied by measures to
ensure effective capacity for planning, budgeting,
implementation and monitoring in local
governments, all of which have a critical bearing on
service quality. Efforts to strengthen the professional
and technical skills of local government employees
and to improve the internal organisation and
management style of local administration are often
central to building such capacity (Fiszbein 1997; Dyer
and Rose 2005).
Managerial and technical capacity is not only a key
determinant of the performance of local officials in
relation to service delivery, but also influences their
behaviour towards users of services. Centralised
service delivery through hierarchically organised line
departments and deconcentrated agencies gives rise
to behavioural norms that may not be conducive to
participation and greater responsiveness. Creating an
organisational culture in local government that is
more citizen-friendly and receptive to active
community involvement, as well as performance
oriented, requires a combination of incentives and
focused capacity-building measures to complement
the strengthening of technical and managerial skills.
4 Conclusion
This article has sought to ascertain the impact of
decentralised service delivery on equity and efficiency
outcomes. Subject to constraints of data availability,
two main conclusions arise from a review of available
evidence in less-developed countries: (1) the quality
and equity of access have not improved with the
decentralisation of health and education services; and
(2) equity and efficiency outcomes are closely related
to the availability of financial resources and local
government capacity.
These insights tend to give rise to two types of policy
prescription, neither of which is closely compatible
with democratic decentralisation: (1) health and
education services are better administered by
deconcentrated public agencies working under the
direct control of central line departments, and
(2) expanding the role of private providers and
introducing user fees can improve quality and
efficiency of resource use. However, experience
suggests that while efficiency gains may be realised,
neither of these approaches is conducive to
participation in local governance, nor are they
guaranteed to produce outcomes that are more
favourable to equity and social justice objectives.
The challenge for proponents of democratic
decentralisation is to specify methods and
approaches by which equity objectives can be
realised under decentralised forms of service
delivery. Successful interventions are not premised
on participation and accountability alone, but
require attention to political factors (such as
commitment, leadership and mobilisation),
institutional arrangements, financial resources and
technical and managerial capacity. Greater emphasis
should be given to measuring and monitoring
service delivery outcomes under decentralised forms
of provision, to ensure that participation in local
governance produces real gains for the poor in
terms of improved access and quality of services.
Failure to do so will undermine the allure of
democratic decentralisation and encourage policy
alternatives that run counter to the ethos of
participation in local governance and the potential
for improving service provision for the benefit of
the poor.
IDS Bulletin Volume 38  Number 1  January 2007 15
References
Astiz, M.F., Wiseman, A.W. and Baker, D.B. (2002)
‘Slouching Towards Decentralization: Consequences
of Curricular Control in National Education
Systems’, Comparative Education Review 46.1: 66–88
Azfar, O., Kähkönen, S., Lanyi, A., Meagher, P. and
Rutherford, D. (2004) ‘Decentralization,
Governance and Public Service: The Impact of
Institutional Arrangements’, in M.S. Kimenyi and
P. Meagher (eds), Devolution and Development:
Governance Prospects in Decentralizing States,
Aldershot: Ashgate
Bahl, R. and Linn, J. (1994) ‘Fiscal Decentralization
and Intergovernmental Transfers in Less
Developed Countries’, Publius – Journal of Fiscal
Federalism 24.1: 1–19
Baiocchi, G. (2001) ‘Participation, Activism and
Politics: The Porto Alegre Experiment and
Deliberative Democratic Theory’, Politics and
Society 29.1: 43–72
Bird, R. and Vaillancourt, F. (eds) (1999) Fiscal
Decentralization in Developing Countries,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Blair, H. (2000) ‘Participation and Accountability at
the Periphery: Democratic Local Governance in
Six Countries’, World Development 28.1: 21–39
Burki, S.J., Perry, G.E. and Dillinger, W.R. (1999)
Beyond the Center: Decentralizing the State,
Washington DC: The World Bank, World Bank
Latin American and Caribbean Studies
Chaudhuri, S. and Heller, P. (2002) ‘The Plasticity of
Participation: Evidence from a Participatory
Governance Experiment’, mimeo, Department of
Economics, Columbia University
Crook, R.C. and Manor, J. (1998) Democracy and
Decentralisation in South Asia and West Africa:
Participation, Accountability and Performance,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Crook, R.C. and Sverrisson, A.S. (2003) ‘Does
Decentralisation Contribute to Poverty
Reduction? Surveying the Evidence’, in
P.P. Houtzager and M. Moore (eds), Changing
Paths: International Development and the New
Politics of Inclusion, Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press: 233–59
Crook, R.C. and Sverrisson, A.S. (2001) Decentralisation
and Poverty-Alleviation in Developing Countries: A
Comparative Analysis or, is West Bengal Unique?, IDS
Working Paper 130, Brighton: IDS
Dyer, C. and Rose, P. (2005) ‘Decentralisation for
Educational Development? An Editorial
Introduction’, Compare 35.2: 105–13
Escheverri-Gent, J. (1993) The State and the Poor:
Public Policy and Political Development in India and
the United States, Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press
Fiszbein, A. (1997) ‘The Emergence of Local Capacity:
Lessons from Colombia’, World Development 25.7:
1029–43
Forero, H. and Salazar, M. (1991) ‘Local Government
and Decentralization in Colombia,’ Environment
and Urbanisation 3.2: 121–6
Francis, P. and James, R. (2003) ‘Balancing Rural
Poverty Reduction and Citizen Participation: The
Contradictions of Uganda’s Decentralization
Program’, World Development 31.2: 325–37
Gideon, J. (2001) ‘The Decentralization of Primary
Health Care in Chile’, Public Administration and
Development 21.3: 223–31
Heller, P. (2001) ‘Moving the State: The Politics of
Democratic Decentralisation in Kerala, South
Africa, and Porto Alegre’, Politics and Society 29.1:
131–63
Isaac, T. with Franke, R.W. (2000) Local Democracy
and Development: People’s Campaign for
Decentralized Planning in Kerala, New Delhi:
LeftWord
Johnson, C. (2001) ‘Local Democracy, Democratic
Decentralisation and Rural Development:
Theories, Challenges and Options for Policy’,
Development Policy Review 19.4: 521–32
Litvack, J., Ahmad, J. and Bird, R. (1998) Rethinking
Decentralization in Developing Countries,
Washington DC: The World Bank, Poverty
Reduction and Economic Management Network
Mahal, A., Srivastava, V. and Sanan, S. (2000)
Decentralization and Public Sector Delivery of Health
and Education Services: The Indian Experience,
Discussion Papers on Development Policy 20,
Bonn: Centre for Development Research,
University of Bonn
Montoya-Aguilar, C. and Vaughan, P. (1990)
‘Decentralization and Local Management of the
Health System in Chile’, in Mills, A., Vaughan, J.P.,
Smith, D.L. and Tabibzadeh, I. (1990) Health System
Decentralization: Concepts, Issues and Country
Experience, Geneva: World Health Organization
(WHO): 55–63
Mwabu, G., Ugaz, C. and White, G. (eds) (2001) Social
Provision in Low-income Countries: New Patterns
and Emerging Trends, Oxford: Oxford University
Press
Nickson, R.A. (1995) Local Government in Latin
America, Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Robinson Does Decentralisation Improve Equity and Efficiency in Public Service Delivery Provision?16
Olowu, D. and Wunsch, J.S. (eds) (2004) Local
Governance in Africa: The Challenges of Democratic
Decentralisation, Boulder: Lynne Rienner
One World Action (2001) Developing Gender-Sensitive
Local Services, report of a seminar organised by
One World Action and the British Council
One World Action (1999) Influence and Access – Local
Democracy and Basic Service Provision, report of a
seminar organised by One World Action
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development) (2006) Decentralisation in Asian
Health Systems: Friend or Foe?, Policy Insights 18,
Paris: OECD Development Centre, May
Parry, T.R. (1997) ‘Decentralization and Privatization:
Education Policy in Chile’, Journal of Public Policy
17.1: 107–33
Prawda, J. (1993) ‘Educational Decentralization in
Latin America: Lessons Learned’, International
Journal of Educational Development 13.3: 253–64
Robinson, M. (1998) ‘Democracy Participation and
Public Policy: The Politics of Institutional Design’,
in M. Robinson and G. White (eds), The Democratic
Developmental State: Politics and Institutional
Reform, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Schneider, A. (2003) Who Gets What from Whom?
The Impact of Decentralisation on Tax Capacity and
Pro-Poor Policy, IDS Working Paper 179, Brighton:
IDS
Smith, B. (1985) Decentralisation: The Territorial
Dimension of the State, London: George, Allen and
Unwin
Stewart, F. and Ranis, G. (1994) Decentralization in
Chile, Occasional Paper 14, New York: United
Nations Development Programme, Human
Development Report Office
Tankersley, W.B. and Cuzán, A.G. (1996) ‘Privatization
and Decentralization in the United States and
Chile’, Journal of Developing Societies XII.1: 104–18
Wunsch, J.S. (2001) ‘Decentralization, Local
Governance and “Recentralization” in Africa’,
Public Administration and Development 21.4: 277–88
IDS Bulletin Volume 38  Number 1  January 2007 17
